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Venezuela's Reopening

From resource access to investable cash flow

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ASSESSMENT

Conditional opportunity; execution remains the investment test.

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IN THIS REPORT

Summary

- 01 What the oil agreement actually changes
- 02 An industrial recovery, not simply a geological discovery
- 03 Macro normalization needs a second transmission mechanism
- 04 Sanctions: permissions attach to activities and parties
- 05 Where economic value might accrue
- 06 A transparent operating case
- 07 Stress the economics before extrapolating the story
- 08 The fixed-income concept: recovery is a legal cash-flow question
- 09 A falsifiable thesis and monitoring framework
- 10 Disclosures, publication scope and methodology

Source register

Summary

Venezuela merits renewed institutional attention because commercial access, operating arrangements and international engagement are changing. The strongest investment question is where incremental, legally accessible cash flow will accrue as that reopening proceeds. A resource concession, an operating company's earnings and a legacy creditor's recovery are different claims on different cash flows.

The central case in this report is an oil-led reopening that first benefits projects able to fund rehabilitation, deliver saleable barrels and collect payment. A broader sovereign recovery requires additional progress on fiscal institutions, creditor treatment and durable political legitimacy. This is an analytical framework, not a security recommendation or an assertion that current market prices offer attractive returns.

FOUR CONCLUSIONS

- 1. The announced agreements are economically consequential, but their headline scale is not a valuation.** The late-August U.S.-Venezuela arrangement combines concessions, corporate ownership, governance and oil-purchase rights. The September company announcements add identifiable operating projects. Financing, construction and distributions remain subsequent tests. [S1, S2, S3, S4]
- 2. The most useful near-term evidence is collected cash per incremental barrel.** Production growth alone can conceal working-capital strain, unfavorable sales terms, sustaining investment and restricted proceeds. A project can improve national output while delivering little cash to its minority owners or to old creditors. This is the report's analytical inference.

3. Reopening is legally segmented. Oil operations, secondary-market trading, new financing, restructuring and enforcement follow different permissions. A license that enables one activity does not automatically enable the others. [S7, S8, S9, S10]

4. The opportunity must survive less favorable oil prices. EIA's September outlook forecasts Brent averaging approximately \$90 per barrel in the second half of 2026 and \$74 in 2027. These are forecasts, not current tradable quotes. Financing a multiyear rehabilitation program on a temporarily high oil price risks overstating its resilience. [S14]

WHAT WOULD CHANGE THE ASSESSMENT?

A more constructive assessment requires evidence of funded projects, independently reconcilable output and exports, reliable collections, and improved rules for allocating cash. A more negative assessment follows material license tightening, repeated payment failures, capex deferrals or politically contested contract changes. Announcements alone do not meet either valuation or execution standards.

Reader's guide: Deal mechanics, section 1; operating constraints, section 2; macro transmission, section 3; sanctions, section 4; investment channels, section 5; operating economics, sections 6-7; creditor recovery, section 8; catalysts and risks, section 9; disclosures, section 10; sources.

Important: General, impersonal research. No buy/sell rating, price target, portfolio allocation or assessment of individual suitability is provided. Read the disclosures and methodology in section 10.

1. What the oil agreement actually changes

EXHIBIT 1

Separate the announced rights from the required execution

ANNOUNCED TERM	PUBLIC DESCRIPTION	INVESTMENT INTERPRETATION
Resource access	NABEP: 17 fields; approximately 65 billion barrels described as proven reserves; 100-year concessions	Development rights require field-level economics and enforceability diligence.
Corporate stake	U.S. government receives 35% of NABEP's parent	A minority economic stake can coexist with substantial governance rights.
Purchase rights	20% of output purchasable at production cost; first refusal over remaining 80%	Sales economics depend on definitions, exercise and pricing terms.
Governance	Board appointment veto; U.S.-citizen board majority; U.S. law and courts for the government agreement	Governance provisions do not eliminate operational or sovereign risk.
Development plan	Up to \$100 billion investment; expected \$200 billion taxes and royalties over 25 years	Announced ambitions, not verified funded capital or discounted value.

Source: White House fact sheet, 31 August 2026 [S1]. Terms are government descriptions; underlying executed agreements and independent reserve reports were not reviewed.

In plain English, the arrangement aims to connect Venezuelan resources with private development capital and U.S. strategic purchasing interests. It does not mean the oil has already been produced, that every barrel can be extracted profitably, or that the stated resource volume belongs economically to a public-market investor. The public description of control also should not be mistaken for majority equity ownership.

THE COMPANY AGREEMENTS ARE SEPARATE EVIDENCE

Chevron reported revised joint-venture terms and plans for more than \$7 billion of investment over five years, targeting approximately 600,000 barrels per day. Its release identifies a 49% interest in Petroindependencia and additional acreage. These are joint-venture plans and production targets, not Chevron's net equity output or a completed cash expenditure. [S2]

Eni announced a 25-year Junin-5 operating contract, with extension possible, assigning it technical, financial and commercial management. Its release reports approximately 12,000 barrels per day of current field output and 35 billion barrels of certified oil in place. Oil in place is a geological quantity, not the same measure as economically recoverable proved reserves. [S3]

The Department of Energy separately described a GE Vernova electricity program targeting 1 GW within 24 months and a further 5 GW over the following four years. Those are announced capacity objectives; delivered, available electricity is the relevant operating outcome. [S4]

QUESTIONS THE HEADLINE DOES NOT ANSWER

The full financing waterfall, capital-call obligations, minority protections, cost definition for preferential purchases, termination compensation and competing claims are not established by a press release. Nor does a long concession ensure that lenders will finance a long repayment period. An institutional underwriting process needs executed documents, technical reserves work and a bankable development schedule before assigning an asset value.

Do not add these announcements into a single national production forecast. Projects can have different dates, ownership definitions and overlapping infrastructure dependencies. The numerical models later in this report therefore use explicit hypothetical increments rather than an unsourced sum of targets.


2. An industrial recovery, not simply a geological discovery

The scarce inputs are reliable infrastructure, finance and institutions. EIA's historical country analysis describes deterioration associated with underinvestment, mismanagement, sanctions and the economic crisis. It estimates approximately 303 billion barrels of proven crude reserves for 2023 and explains the significance of heavy crude and diluent availability. These historical figures establish context; they are not a new reserve audit. [S5]

EXHIBIT 2

Recent production: recovery with a slowing monthly increment

Crude output, thousand barrels/day



Source: EFE, 10 September 2026 [S6]. These are the direct official series as relayed by EFE, not independently verified secondary-source OPEC estimates. The OPEC download could not be independently retrieved in this research session. July is explicitly derived; do not mix this series with secondary-source estimates without reconciliation.

The January-to-August increase is 277,000 barrels per day, or 30.0% using the displayed rounded endpoints. The August increment is only 1,000 barrels per day, or about 0.08%. This does not establish a structural ceiling from a single observation. It does show why extrapolating early

recovery indefinitely would be weak underwriting. Restoring shut-in capacity can be easier than bringing on greenfield production.

FOUR OPERATING BOTTLENECKS

Reservoir to saleable crude. Heavy oil may need blending or upgrading before transport and refining. A barrel of field production is not automatically one barrel of exportable Venezuelan-origin crude sold at the benchmark price. Volume accounting must distinguish indigenous crude, purchased diluent, blended exports and inventories to avoid overstating both growth and revenue.

Power and equipment availability. A development schedule must align wells, pumps, gathering systems, electricity, terminals and maintenance crews. A bottleneck in any one component can strand investment elsewhere. Track actual availability and downtime, not merely nameplate electrical capacity or equipment deliveries.

People and procurement. Rehabilitation needs experienced operators, reliable contractors and equipment that can be serviced locally. Faster activity can itself inflate labor and logistics costs. Budget contingency should cover delayed mobilization and rework; an apparently low lifting cost is not a complete estimate of the cost of growth.

Export and collection capacity. Storage, loading, shipping, insurance, customer acceptance and banking are a connected operating chain. Completion should be measured at collection in an authorized account. A loaded cargo improves activity statistics but may still leave financing, receivable or payment restrictions unresolved.

The analytical implication is to favor evidence from repeatable operating cycles: spend, produce, sell, collect and reinvest. Short bursts of output without reconciled cash generation do not establish a durable reopening.

3. Macro normalization needs a second transmission mechanism

The relationship has shifted from confrontation toward selective commercial cooperation. EFE reports that the United States captured Nicolas Maduro in January 2026; subsequent reforms under acting President Delcy Rodriguez opened strategic sectors to foreign investment. This political rupture explains the new opportunity, while raising questions about the durability and legitimacy of resulting arrangements. [S6]

An oil recovery can increase foreign-exchange supply without resolving the sovereign balance sheet. The IMF resumed dealings with Venezuela on 16 April 2026, following the views of members representing a majority of its voting power. The World Bank also announced renewed dealings. Institutional re-engagement is a meaningful step, but those announcements are not evidence of an approved lending program, a disbursement or a completed debt agreement. [S11, S12]

EXHIBIT 3

Macro reference points have different dates and meanings

INDICATOR	REPORTED VALUE	INTERPRETATION AND LIMITATION
2026 real GDP growth	4.0%	IMF country-page projection accessed 21 September; not realized growth
2026 consumer-price change	387.4%	IMF country-page projection; not a September monthly inflation reading
Public debt/GDP	Approximately 180%	IMF statement of 15 January 2026; excludes legal judgments/arbitrations
Latest Article IV listed	13 September 2004	IMF country page; underscores limited recent surveillance history

Sources: IMF country page [S13] and January briefing [S15]. The live country page does not supply a release vintage for its headline projections. Do not label them September forecasts. The January debt ratio is historical context, not an updated September balance-sheet estimate.

HOW THE RECOVERY COULD REACH THE WIDER ECONOMY

The first channel is export revenue. Additional net export receipts can relieve foreign-currency constraints and support necessary imports. The second is investment demand: field work and infrastructure purchases can create orders and employment. The third is fiscal revenue, provided taxes and royalties are collected and available for public use. Each channel can be weakened by import intensity, contractual allocations, restricted accounts or losses elsewhere in the public sector.

A stronger macro case would combine oil income with credible spending priorities, more transparent accounts and monetary stabilization. Otherwise, additional receipts may be absorbed by accumulated obligations while domestic purchasing power remains unstable. Real recovery should be visible in reliable services, imports of productive equipment and household conditions, not only nominal revenue or a stronger exchange-rate print.

WHY DEBT-TO-GDP ALONE CANNOT ESTABLISH VALUE

A debt ratio depends on the definition of liabilities, the exchange rate used to translate output, and the GDP estimate. A changing denominator can improve the ratio without extinguishing any obligation. A complete sovereign assessment would reconcile principal, arrears, interest, official bilateral claims, commercial liabilities, litigation and contingent obligations. This report does not construct an artificial consolidated debt total from incompatible estimates.

For investment analysis, the relevant bridge is recurring fiscal cash after essential spending and reconstruction, then the amount legally and politically available for debt service. That is a smaller and more uncertain figure than national gross oil sales. The report's operating model deliberately stops before claiming a sovereign payment capacity.

4. Sanctions: permissions attach to activities and parties

There is no single countrywide investability switch. The following is a research map of selected U.S. authorizations as checked on 21 September 2026. It is not a legal opinion or an exhaustive permission matrix. Transaction eligibility requires the operative license, all exclusions, counterparties, ownership and payment arrangements to be assessed together.

EXHIBIT 4

Commercial reopening and creditor permissions are distinct

ACTIVITY	REFERENCE	WHAT THE REFERENCE ESTABLISHES
Certain PDVSA transactions	GL 52C, 14 September 2026	Conditional authorization for established U.S. entities; separate debt and enforcement exclusions remain.
Specified operators' oil/gas activity	GL 50C, 27 August 2026	Conditional authorization for listed entities and subsidiaries, with payment and reporting rules.
Certain secondary-market securities dealings	GL 3I / GL 9H; FAQ 1136	Applicable permissions exist; the primary-market restrictions are a separate issue.
Restructuring preparation	GL 58, 5 May 2026	Certain legal, financial advisory and consulting services; not actual restructuring or direct creditor negotiations under this license.

Sources: operative OFAC licenses and guidance [S7, S8, S9, S10]. This table condenses only selected provisions; it does not reproduce every condition.

GL 52C defines an established U.S. entity by organization on or before 29 January 2025. Covered contracts require disputes to occur in specified jurisdictions. Payments to blocked persons generally must enter designated funds or Treasury-directed accounts, with stated exceptions. Its exclusions include otherwise prohibited bond/debt transactions, certain settlements and enforcement, blocked-property releases, blocked vessels and specified counterparties. It also excludes changes to the governance of the identified CITGO entities. [S7]

GL 50C addresses listed operators and subsidiaries. It imposes contract, payment and reporting requirements and excludes specified transactions and counterparties. Its annex and the transaction facts matter; merely operating in the energy sector is insufficient. [S8]

OFAC FAQ 1136 explains that the October 2023 amendments removed the prior non-U.S.-buyer restriction for covered secondary-market securities dealings. It also states that primary-market sanctions remain. This report therefore does not characterize every Venezuelan security as prohibited, nor does it infer blanket permission to buy, finance or settle any instrument. [S9]

GL 58 allows specified preparatory services but expressly excludes the restructuring, transfer or settlement of debt and direct government-creditor negotiations under that license. It also contains blocked-property and other exclusions and a contract-submission requirement. Preparatory work is not completed creditor normalization. [S10]

ANALYTICAL CONSEQUENCES

A commercial improvement can precede debt relief by a substantial interval. Conversely, permission to trade a covered security need not imply permission for a new-money exchange, collateral enforcement or distribution. Those are distinct legal events that affect timing and value.

The diligence question is not whether a broker screen displays a security. It is whether the actual parties and transaction are authorized and operationally settleable. Custodian acceptance, banking support and export-control obligations can remain relevant even where an OFAC authorization applies. Eligibility should be rechecked when facts or law change; this report does not provide a transaction execution route.

5. Where economic value might accrue

The order in which the economy improves may differ from the order in which investors receive cash. The following comparison is an original analytical framework. Company names elsewhere identify participants in public announcements, not recommended securities.

EXHIBIT 5

Compare claims on cash rather than country labels

CHANNEL	POTENTIAL SOURCE OF VALUE	EVIDENCE REQUIRED	PRINCIPAL FAILURE MODE
Operating projects	Incremental saleable output and improved terms	Funded capex, economic ownership, netbacks, collections	Cost overruns; restrictions; adverse contract change
Services and equipment	Rehabilitation and maintenance orders	Funded customer, contract margin, payment security	Backlog that never converts to collected cash
Power and logistics	Removal of physical production constraints	Utilization, tariff/payment terms, available capacity	Unfunded public receivables or construction delays
Refining and trading	Feedstock access and optimization	Delivered crude economics and margin sensitivity	Higher feedstock demand compresses the advantage
Legacy sovereign/PDVSA claims	Eventual debt-service capacity and negotiated treatment	Verified claims, legal permissions, restructuring terms	Long delay, subordination, adverse recovery allocation

THE OPERATING CASE

A project with existing infrastructure may have a shorter path to cash generation than an undeveloped resource concession. But that is a hypothesis to test, not a guarantee that a brownfield project is attractive. Rehabilitation can reveal deferred environmental costs, damaged equipment and lower reservoir productivity. The analyst should distinguish maintenance required to preserve output from investment that truly creates incremental output.

The correct valuation unit is the investor's share of distributable project cash after funding obligations. Gross production, total project capex and economic ownership should be reconciled before being inserted into a model. Tax treatment, recovery of prior receivables and constrained distributions can alter the result even if the operating target is met.

THE SUPPLIER CASE

Suppliers may earn revenue earlier in a development cycle, but can become involuntary lenders through slow collections. A signed contract is more credible when the customer has funded its capital program and the supplier can demonstrate timely cash receipts. Working-capital exposure, performance guarantees and local execution costs should be evaluated alongside the headline order size.

THE DIVERSIFIED-COMPANY CASE

A company operating globally can absorb local disruption more readily than a single-country project, but its Venezuelan exposure may be too small to drive total valuation. A valid research bridge would isolate incremental cash flow, deduct associated investment and compare the change with the company's existing enterprise value. Country enthusiasm alone cannot establish that the stock is mispriced.

THE LEGACY-CREDITOR CASE

Old claims can benefit from improved capacity to pay, but they do not automatically participate in a new project's economics. New investment may require priority cash allocations that improve production while postponing residual distributions. Without current executable prices, verified legal claims and a restructuring framework, this report cannot rank specific instruments or establish a margin of safety.


6. A transparent operating case

Question: what could 100,000 additional saleable barrels per day contribute before fiscal and financing claims? The model below is an original hypothetical steady-state illustration. It is not a field forecast, a national production forecast, or an estimate of any named company's profitability.

EXHIBIT 6

Illustrative annual cash bridge

Incremental saleable output: 36.5 million barrels (100,000 b/d; 365 days)



Source: original scenario assumptions and arithmetic. Dollar figures rounded to three decimals. The discount includes transport to the specified sale point; operating/blending costs exclude that same transport to prevent double counting. Initial rehabilitation/development spending is excluded and must be funded separately.

READ THE BRIDGE FROM LEFT TO RIGHT

The model begins with saleable incremental output, not unprocessed field volumes. It assumes all of those barrels are sold and paid for within the modeled year. The benchmark-to-realized-price adjustment represents quality and transport differences. Operating and sustaining costs are deducted to obtain a cash surplus before royalties, taxes, financing costs, working-capital changes and development capital.

The resulting \$1.095 billion is not free cash flow to equity, government revenue or money available for bondholders. Those quantities require additional contractual and fiscal information. In particular, any preferential purchase arrangement or unusual sales allocation must be modeled explicitly; it cannot be silently absorbed into a standard benchmark discount.

AVOID TWO COMMON VALUATION ERRORS

Counting the same economic interest twice. A public company's net production may already reflect ownership, whereas a press release can present total joint-venture production. Applying ownership again to a net number understates exposure; treating a gross number as net overstates it. The same care is needed when dividing development capex among partners.

Ignoring the cash needed before steady state. The bridge assumes a fully operating incremental asset. A project that takes years to reach that point can consume substantial cash during construction and commissioning. Initial capital, ramp-up losses, contingencies, interest during

construction and abandonment obligations belong in a dated project cash-flow model before anyone calculates a return.


At these assumptions, each additional 10,000 b/d contributes \$109.5 million of annual pre-fiscal surplus. That linear relationship is only a mathematical sensitivity: actual marginal costs, capacity constraints and fiscal terms can change with scale.

7. Stress the economics before extrapolating the story

EXHIBIT 7

Price and operating scale both matter


Annual pre-fiscal operating surplus, \$bn. Original hypothetical sensitivity; constant discount \$15/bbl, operating/blending \$20/bbl and sustaining capital \$10/bbl.



Formula: $\text{output} \times 365 \times (\text{benchmark} - 45) / 1,000,000,000$. The grid is not a set of security returns. The \$45/bbl operating threshold is before fiscal charges, development capital and financing; it is not a full-cycle break-even price.

EXHIBIT 8

Bundled operational stresses



COLLECTION AND RAMP-UP CAN DOMINATE THE FIRST YEAR

At the managed-recovery assumptions, a 10% delay in collecting annual gross sales ties up \$219 million of cash. If all operating and sustaining costs are nevertheless paid on time, same-year pre-fiscal cash falls from \$1.095 billion to \$876 million. A collection delay is not necessarily a permanent loss, but the project must finance it. A defaulted receivable creates a different, potentially permanent impairment.

A six-month operating delay, simplified as half a year at full output and no output before commissioning, halves the operating-period surplus to \$547.5 million before considering idle costs, construction spending or financing. This illustration is not a realistic ramp profile; it demonstrates why dates belong in a valuation model. A combination of delay, higher costs and a lower oil price is more damaging than any one-variable sensitivity.

The broad implication is to require an investment case that remains financeable when oil prices normalize and commissioning is imperfect. The most attractive geological asset may still be a poor equity investment if lenders, contractors, tax authorities and senior partners absorb the available cash before minority distributions begin.

8. The fixed-income concept: recovery is a legal cash-flow question

A general discussion of distressed sovereign recovery can be useful without recommending a **named bond**. The analysis must still distinguish legal eligibility, claim validity, the size and timing of any recovery, and the price paid. Omitting an identifier does not convert a substantive investment recommendation into non-advice.

For Venezuela, the economic thesis would be that improved oil-related fiscal capacity and institutional engagement eventually support a consensual treatment of legacy obligations. The counter-thesis is that reconstruction needs, competing claims and prolonged legal or political disagreement absorb the improvement. The evidence in this report does not establish a settlement date or recovery percentage.

A CONCEPTUAL RECOVERY WATERFALL

Begin with verified national fiscal resources, then allow for essential expenditure and the investment needed to maintain those resources. Assess the perimeter of legally recognized obligations and the proposed treatment of each creditor group. Only then estimate cash or securities distributed to a particular class of claims. There is no universal waterfall that lets an unsecured sovereign claim inherit the economics of a specific oil field.

Potential distinctions include sovereign versus corporate obligors, collateral, guarantees, governing law, judgments, contractual aggregation provisions and recoverability of arrears. These require instrument-level documents and legal advice. This report has not audited individual claims or the current CITGO litigation and sale process, and does not assign a value to that asset or its proceeds.

EXHIBIT 9

Timing alone changes the value of a hypothetical payment

Present value of a single hypothetical \$50 distribution per \$100 of original principal. No interim payments. Pure mathematical illustration; no assertion of a Venezuelan recovery or an investment's return.



Source: original calculation, $PV = 50 / (1 + \text{discount rate})^{\text{years}}$. Rates are assumptions, not observed yields. Distributions are expressed per \$100 original principal, excluding accrued-interest entitlements, legal costs and taxes. A market-value recovery ratio would use a different denominator.

At a constant 15% discount rate, moving that payment from year three to year seven reduces its present value by about 42.8%. This illustrates the cost of time even when the nominal payment is unchanged. It does not estimate the probability of payment or compensate separately for a failed restructuring.

An actionable credit assessment would need a verifiable entry price and accrued-interest convention, bid/offer and liquidity information, valid title, transaction permissions and a dated restructuring model. None is supplied here. Consequently, this report expresses no view that a specific security, a generic Venezuelan debt basket or any quoted recovery price is cheap.

9. A falsifiable thesis and monitoring framework

The research stance should improve only when cash-flow evidence catches up with policy intent. The following milestones are proposed analytical tests, not scheduled promises or an automated monitoring service.

EXHIBIT 10

Catalysts, evidence and reasons to revise the case

TEST	EVIDENCE TO SEEK	CONSTRUCTIVE SIGNAL	ADVERSE SIGNAL
Legal continuity	OFAC text; applicable local law and executed contracts	Clear, durable scope and accepted banking support	Narrowed permissions; disputed contract validity
Investment execution	Funded budgets; partner contributions; commissioning records	Capital deployed against a credible schedule	Deferred funding or repeated overruns
Output quality	Reconciled production, exports and inventory	Sustained saleable growth across several months	Output gains explained mainly by inventories/diluent
Cash conversion	Audited receivables, receipts and restrictions	Timely collection and transparent allocation	Rising overdue balances or inaccessible proceeds
Macro institutions	IMF/World Bank program documents and fiscal reporting	Verified support and transparent spending	Re-engagement without implementable reform
Creditor process	Lawful process, verified claims, published terms	Credible route from discussion to execution	Litigation expansion or undefined claim perimeter

Source: original analytical framework. Reconcile company statements with official documents and independent evidence wherever practicable.

THREE RISKS THAT CAN INVALIDATE AN APPARENTLY FAVORABLE MODEL

Political durability and legitimacy. A contract's commercial attractiveness depends on whether institutions can implement and sustain it. Future administrations may challenge a bargain that lacks broad acceptance. Assess lawful approval, transparency and domestic distribution of benefits rather than treating foreign political sponsorship as a substitute for enforceable rights.

Correlated operating and financial stress. A lower commodity price can reduce financing capacity at the same time suppliers require larger deposits and the state seeks more revenue. A project may then cut sustaining investment, worsening output. Scenario analysis should therefore consider linked shocks rather than assuming every input can vary independently.

Environmental and community liabilities. Remediation, spill prevention, worker safety, water use and community consent affect both project economics and social legitimacy. Historical liabilities and responsibility for future abandonment should be allocated explicitly. A narrow calculation of field costs can miss cash obligations that determine whether an investment creates durable value.

DECISION DISCIPLINE

Over the next quarter, the highest-value research updates would be license changes, funded capital schedules and evidence of actual collections. Over the next year, the focus shifts toward sustained output, infrastructure availability and the fiscal treatment of incremental receipts.

These are review horizons measured from the report date, not predictions about when official milestones will occur.

The central conclusion remains conditional: Venezuela's reopening can create economic value, but the investable claim is the right to receive cash after all relevant obligations and restrictions. That right must be identified and valued before the country narrative can become an investment decision.

10. Disclosures, publication scope and methodology

PUBLIC DISCLOSURES

This report was prepared for ShaneHixon.com as general, impersonal research and educational analysis. It is not an offer, solicitation, individualized investment recommendation, legal opinion or tax advice. It does not consider any reader's objectives, circumstances, risk tolerance or legal eligibility. No security rating, price target, recommended trade or portfolio allocation is provided.

I have no holdings in any security mentioned in this report, and no compensation arrangements, sponsorships, or employer/compliance affiliations to disclose as of the report date. The report does not claim original interviews, fieldwork or independent reserve verification.

Company and institutional names identify sources and participants in reported developments. Their inclusion is not an endorsement of their securities.

Investments exposed to Venezuela may involve substantial loss, illiquidity, default, expropriation, sanctions changes, currency restrictions, operational interruption and uncertain legal recovery. A legal authorization does not establish commercial attractiveness or ensure that a bank, broker or custodian will support a transaction. The analysis reflects a dated information set and may become obsolete; there is no promise of continuous updates.

RESEARCH AND CALCULATION CONVENTIONS

The cutoff is 21 September 2026. Sources favor operative government documents and company announcements; EFE supplies a clearly identified secondary report of production data. Facts, announced targets and original hypothetical calculations are labeled separately. Historical background is not presented as a current observation. No paid market-data feed, live bond pricing, private contract, detailed reserve audit or complete sovereign debt ledger was reviewed.

All model dollars are nominal U.S. dollars. Annual operating examples use 365 days and steady-state saleable volumes. Arithmetic is calculated before display rounding. Scenario assumptions are deliberately illustrative and carry no probability weights. Initial development capital, fiscal charges, financing, ownership allocations and working-capital changes are excluded unless stated. Exhibit 9 is a single-payment discounting exercise, not a security valuation. Reproducible inputs, formulas and source identifiers accompany the report.

Source register

All sources accessed 21 September 2026. Source numbers in the text map to the linked entries below. Government and company statements establish what was announced; they do not independently verify execution. Publication dates are distinguished from access dates.

S1. White House, 31 August 2026. Fact sheet on the U.S.-Venezuela oil agreement. Source for the public description of NABEP rights, concessions, governance, investment ambition and fiscal expectations. Read the official fact sheet (<https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2026/08/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-announces-historic-oil-agreement-to-secure-american-energy-dominance-and-drive-venezuelas-economic-recovery/>).

S2. Chevron, 2 September 2026. Company announcement on revised Venezuelan joint-venture terms, investment plans, production target and acreage. Targets are management statements, not independently verified forecasts. Read Chevron's announcement (<https://chevroncorp.gcs-web.com/node/38701>).

S3. Eni, 2 September 2026. Company announcement on the Junin-5 contract, operatorship, duration, oil in place and current production. Read Eni's announcement (<https://www.eni.com/en-IT/media/press-release/2026/09/eni-signs-strategic-contract-in-venezuela-and-becomes-operator-of-the-super-giant-junin-5-oil-field.html>).

S4. U.S. Department of Energy, 2 September 2026. Energy agreements fact sheet, including announced GE Vernova electricity-capacity objectives. Read the DOE fact sheet (<https://www.energy.gov/articles/fact-sheet-delivering-president-trumps-promise-unleash-prosperity-and-security-united>).

S5. U.S. Energy Information Administration. Venezuela country analysis; historical energy-sector context and 2023 reserves estimate. Data reference years vary. Read the EIA country analysis (https://www.eia.gov/international/content/analysis/countries_long/Venezuela/).

S6. EFE, 10 September 2026. Report of Venezuelan official production figures published by OPEC. Used as a secondary source, with July derived from the reported monthly change. Read EFE's production report (<https://efe.com/economia/2026-09-10/produccion-petroleo-venezuela-agosto/>).

S7. OFAC, 14 September 2026. Venezuela General License 52C. Selected PDVSA transactions; scope, conditions and exclusions. Read the operative license (<https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/936926/download?inline=>).

S8. OFAC, 27 August 2026. Venezuela General License 50C. Operations of specified oil/gas entities and subsidiaries. Read the operative license (<https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/936821/download?inline=>).

S9. OFAC, 18 October 2023. FAQ 1136, explaining covered secondary-market dealings under GLs 3I and 9H and the distinction from primary-market restrictions; checked against the current program index. Read FAQ 1136 (<https://ofac.treasury.gov/faqs/1136>). Current Venezuela sanctions index (<https://ofac.treasury.gov/sanctions-programs-and-country-information/venezuela-related-sanctions>).

S10. OFAC, 5 May 2026. Venezuela General License 58. Restructuring-related preparatory services and explicit exclusions. Read the operative license (<https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/935566/download?inline=>).

S11. IMF, 16 April 2026. Announcement resuming dealings with Venezuela. This establishes re-engagement, not a financing approval. Read the IMF announcement (<https://www.imf.org/en/news/articles/2026/04/16/pr26123-venezuela-imf-announces-resumption-of-dealings>).

S12. World Bank, 16 April 2026. Announcement resuming dealings with Venezuela. Read the World Bank statement (<https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/statement/2026/04/16/world-bank-group-announces-resumption-of-dealings-with-venezuela>).

S13. IMF, live country page. Headline 2026 growth and consumer-price projections and latest listed Article IV date, as displayed at access. Headline projection vintage is not specified on the page. Read the country page (<https://www.imf.org/en/countries/ven>).

S14. EIA, 9 September 2026. Short-Term Energy Outlook, model inputs finalized 3 September. Oil-price outlook used as macro context; not a live market quote. Read the September outlook (<https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/>).

S15. IMF, 15 January 2026. Press briefing discussing economic imbalances, information gaps and estimated public debt. The debt estimate predates subsequent reopening developments. Read the briefing (<https://www.imf.org/en/news/articles/2026/01/15/tr-011526-press-briefing-transcript-julie-kozack-director-communications-dept-jan-15-2026>).

EVIDENCE GAPS THAT CONSTRAIN THE CONCLUSION

The report does not have the complete NABEP transaction documents or financing commitments, audited project economics, independent reserve reports, a reconciled current creditor ledger, executable security prices or an instrument-specific legal opinion. Those omissions prevent an asset valuation, a sovereign recovery forecast and a security recommendation. They do not prevent a sourced assessment of the announced reopening and its economic transmission mechanisms.

The most consequential future evidence would be the conversion of announced rights into funded development and accessible cash. Any subsequent edition should preserve this publication's date, identify new evidence, explain revised assumptions and distinguish a changed fact from a changed analytical judgment.

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No position in any security mentioned.

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